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NOTE
TRUSTS-WILL THE CREATION OF A TRUST DEFEAT
A SPOUSE'S STATUTORY ALLOWANCES?
Dower and courtesy rights of the respective spouses in the
property of the other are an ancient element in our law. It has
been the policy of the law to protect these rights to such an
extent that they can not be cut off by a will or deed.
This fact has caused men at times to seek means, other
than by will, to avoid these legal claims of their wives. This
result has been accomplished in some cases by reasonable antenuptial contracts,' and in others by the execution of concerted
wills, 2 which may prevent a wife from renouncing the will and

from claiming her statutory allowance if the wills were contractual and adequately' executed. These methods, although
effectual in many cases, will not provide a never failing means
for settling the material property rights. Suppose:
A, who is an elderly, wealthy man and the father
of four children by a former marriage, marries B, a
young woman. A wishes to have a reasonable income
from his property for his life and wants the bulk of his
property to go to his children on his death. Is there any
way he can be sure that his wishes will be carried out?
If A dies intestate, B, under Kentucky's Dower and
Curtesy Statute, 3 would be entitled to one-half of the personal
property and a life interest in one-third of the realty. If A
makes a will, and the widow is not satisfied with its terms,
she could renounce the will and claim her rights under the
above statute. 4 It is also possible that B has not consented to
an antenuptial contract and would not be a party to the execution of concerted wills which provide that the bulk of the
property is to go to A's children, even though there is an
adequate provision for her.
1. Gifts inter vivos so as to avoid dower.
While it is true that A may give away the property, inter
vivos, to the children, and thereby diminish his estate, such an
1

Antenuptial Contracts Concerning Property Settlements, Note
(1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 197.
'Evans, Concerted Wills-A Possible Device for Avoiding the
Widow's Privilege of Renunciation (1945) 33 KY. L. J. 79.
3Ky. R. S. 392.020.
4 Ky. R. S. 392.080.
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alienation would not give him a life income.

In Kentucky it is

entirely possible that such a gift, if it constitutes a principal
part of the husband's estate, may be set aside as a fraud on the
widow's rights. The Kentucky Court states, in Payne v.
Tatem,5 that a completed gift by a husband to his heirs apparent raises a presumption of fraud on the widow's rights if the
gift is in excess of the apparent heirs' statutory rights. The
weight of authority elsewhere, however, seems to be that the
husband can convey his property to others without consideration, during his lifetime, even if the purpose is to defeat his
wife's dower. ',
In any event a gift to the children will not be the best
solution since A would not have a life estate in the property.
This result has caused an attempt to set up a trust for the
children.
2.

Conveyances to a trustee.

An absolute, unrestricted conveyance of the property to a
trustee for the use of the children is valid against the claim of
the wife, regardless of the husband's intent to defeat her dower
interest. In Lizes v. Lines, a wife endeavored to establish
dower rights in personal property which the husband had
conveyed to a trustee for the benefit of his children of a former marriage. In that case the court said: "It is a well settled
law in this state that a man may do what he pleases with his
personal estate during his life. He may even beggar himself
and his family if he chooses to commit such an act of folly.
When he dies, and then only, do the rights of the wife attach
to his personal estate". An absolute conveyance in trust, however, is subject to the same objection as an absolute gift inter
iuos, since there is no life income to A.
If A adds to the trust agreement reservations in his own
interest, the question arises as to how far these reservations
limit the grant without causing a mere transfer in name only.
'236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. 2d 2 (1930).
'Wooten v. Keaton, 168 Ark. 981, 272 S. W. 869 (1925); Carey et
Ill. , 64 N. E. 2d 180 (1945); Patterson v.
al. v. Funk, et al., -McLenathan, 296 Ill. 475, 129 N. E. 767 (1921); Mandel v. Bron, 270
Pa. 566, 113 Atl. 834 (1921); Hanes v. Hanes, 239 S. W. 190 (Tex.
Com. App. 1922); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N. W.
750 (1922).
7142
Pa. St. 149, , 21 At. 809, 810 (1891).
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The issue as to what limitations and reservations can be placed
on this type of trust has been before the courts of the various
states many times and has resulted in conflicting decisions.
The majority of the states seem to hold that a mere reservation
of a life estate and a power to revoke the trust dll not alone
amount to a mere colorable conveyance and will be valid and
enforceable against the widow.8
Some settlors are not satisfied with these reservations and
want some measure of independent control over the trust estate
during their lives. In Rose v. Rose, 9 a man, immediately before his marriage to the plaintiff, conveyed his property to a
trustee for the benefit of his daughter by a former marriage,
but he reserved a life estate, a right to revoke, a right to invest
and manage the property, a right to borrow money thereon, and
a right to change the beneficiary. The court held that the trust
was valid and refused to allow the wife to set it aside. This
case seems to go further than any other case in allowing a
trust to be enforced where such a large amount of control is
retained by the settlor. Newman v. Dore,'0 a New York case,
contained similar reservations and the court there held that
the conveyance was merely an illusory transfer of title and
was a fraud on the rights of the widow. New York courts, however, will allow extrinsic evidence to influence their decisions,
as is indicated in Marine Midland Trust Co. of Binghampton v.
Stavdford et al., 1 where the court .permitted a similar trust to
stand, on the ground that the wife had been adequatly provided
for by her husband. The Restatement of Trusts, Section 57,
deals directly with this problem and concludes that if the settlor
retains power to control the trust to any considerable extent,
'Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 194 Atl. 523 (1915);
Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 150 N. E. 866 (1926); Cameron v.
Cameron et al., Ex'rs., 10 Smedes and Marshall 394, 48 Am. Dec.
759 (Miss. 1848); Marine Midland Trust Co. of Binghampton v.
Standford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 648 (1939); Beirne v.
Continental Equitable Title and Trust Co., 307 Pa. 510, 161 Atl. 721
(1932); Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634
(1914); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891); Hall v. Hall
et al., 109 Va. 117, 63 S. E. 420 (1909). Contra: Smith v. Northern
Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N. E. 2d 75 (1944); Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 194 Ohio St. 195, 58 N. E. 2d 381 (1944); Rubin v. Myrub
Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 541, 279 N. Y. S. 867 (1935).
'300 Mich. 73, 1 N. W. 2d 458 (1942).
'o275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. 2d 966 (1937).
256 App. Div. 26, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 648 (1939).
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in addition to a life income and power to revoke, the trust will
be illusory.

12

3.

Declaration of trust by the settlor.

Since A can transfer his personal property to a trustee and
reserve a right to a life income, retain a power to revoke, and
possibly keep some slight measure of control over the trust
property, the next question is, can A declare himself trustee
of his property for the benefit of his children and make the
same reservations for himself? The Restatement of Trusts,
Section 28, provides: "The owner of property can create a
trust of the property by declaring himself trustee of it although
he receives no consideration for the declaration of trust." It
would seem, at first blush, that this would be conclusive and
that it would be immaterial whether the property were transferred to a third person as a trustee or should merely be held
by the settlor-husband as trustee. The problem is not so simple,
however, because to allow such a device would give the husband full and absolute control of the property in a dual capacity, that of beneficiary as well as trustee. This, according to
Newman. v. Dore, 3 would be illusory, since the husband actually transfers nothing during his life.
The courts have been faced with this point directly in a few
cases and they have failed to agree on the issue of the validity
of the trust as against the widow's rights. In Dickerson's Appeal,14 a husband declared himself trustee of certain stock for the
benefit of his children, lie retained a life income and a power
to revoke at will. The court held that such a trust was valid and
"

"(1)

Where by the terms of the trust an interest passes to

the beneficiary during the life of the settlor, the trust is not testamentary merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life estate
or because he reserves in addition a power to revoke the trust in
whole or in part and a power to modify the trust.
"(2) Where the settlor transfers property in trust and'reserves
not only a beneficial life estate and a power to revoke and modify
the trust but also such power to control the trustee as to the details
of the administration of the trust that the trustee is the agent of
the settlor, the disposition so far as it is intended to take effect after
his death is testamentary and is invalid unless the requirements
of the statute relating to the validity of wills are complied with."
" Supra note 10.
For a full discussion of Newman v. Dore see
Smith, The Present Status of "Illusory" Trusts-The Doctrine of
Newman v. Dore Brought Down to Date (1944) 44 MIcH. L. REV. 151.
" 115 Pa. 148, 8 Atl. 64 (1887).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

enforcable against the widow's claim of dower. On the other
hand, in a New York case, Bonder v. Feit,15 a husband declared
himself trustee of his personal property without making any
reservations to himself, and the trust was declared void as
against the rights of the widow. Massachusetts, however, decided that a trust was valid where a father declared himself
trustee of certain stock for his son even though the father retained possession, income for himself and independent control
of the stock during his lifetime. 16 The problem has been before
the Kentucky Court at least.twice and in both cases it was held
that a declaration of a trust, if sufficiently proven, was valid,
that the property was no part of the husband's estate, and that
the widow had no interest therein. 17 These Kentucky decisions
are interesting in view of the attitude taken by the Court in
the case of gifts inter vivos, which was discussed above. If an
inter vivos conveyance by a husband to his children can create
a presumption of fraud on the wife's interest, it would certainly seem that a declaration of a trust by the husband for
the same purpose would likewise be presumptively fraudulent.
But apparently the Court in deciding these trust cases overlooked those involving inter vivos conveyances.
In light of these decisions and the Dickerson case, it would
seem that A could declare himself trustee of his property for the
benefit of his children, retain a life interest in himself, and
still be assured that on his death his wife could claim no more
than he wishes her to have. While there is no doubt that there
is a certain public policy against allowing a man to cut-off his
wife and perhaps his entire family from his estate, we must
also consider the public policy of the inalienable privilege of a
man to dispose of his property as he sees fit during his lifetime.
In the typical case above, there would certainly be no public
policy against A's providing for his children even though such
a trust would avoid the widow's allowance. While it is true
that the legislature has seen fit to allow a wife to renounce an
unfavorable will and take by the statute of descent and distribution, it has not seen fit to declare that a man cannot gratuit'5247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y.S. 814 (1936).
'Murray v. O'Hara, 291 Mass. 75, 195 N. E. 909 (1935).
' DeLeuil's Executors et al. v. DeLeuil, 255 Ky. 406, 74 S. W.
2d 474 (1934); Ginn"s Administratrix et al. v. Ginn's Administrator
et al., 236 Ky. 217, 32 S. W. 2d 971 (1930).
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ously convey his personal property interest during his life without the consent of his wife. It is here proposed that such an
arrangement would be sustained, and certainly so, if a reasonable provision were made for the wife.
It will be noted that in the above discussion only personal
property was conveyed. The usual dower statutes in various
states allow a dower interest in all the real property owned by
the husband during coverture, unless the spouse has joined in the
conveyance and thereby releases that interest. However, some
states, namely, Connecticuts and Georgia, 19 allow dower only
in the lands owned by the spouse at the time of death. In some
states the rights of dower and curtesy have been abolished altogether. 2 11 Therefore, in those jurisdictions, a widow's dower in
land as well as her statutory interest in the personal property
21
can be defeated by a declaration of a trust.
A. E. FUNK, JR.
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